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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Alvarez1 attempts to address 
the constitutional status of lying in the context of military honor.2 More particularly, 
• Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School 
of Law. The title above quotes Sir John Falstaff's question-and-answer "catechism" on the 
nature and value of honor. Set out in expository form, Falstaff concludes as follows: "Can 
honor set a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honor hath 
no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honor? A word .... What is that honor? Air. A trim 
reckoning! Who hath it? He who died a' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? 
No. 'Tis insensible, then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? 
Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST 
PART OF KING HENRY VI act 5, sc. I. While Falstaff is not an infallible guide to honor, his 
conclusion that we may react pathologically to the honorable seems borne out by cases such as 
Alvarez. 
1 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
2 For a sample of diverse perspectives, beyond that of Falstaff, on one conception or 
another of honor, see, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Other Moral Virtues, in THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
bk. V, at 95 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., rev. ed. 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.) ("[H]onour is the prize of 
virtue, and is rendered to the good."); CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS (Chichung 
Huang trans., 1997); HOMER, THE ILIAD 614 (Robert Fagles trans., 1998) ("[G]athering once 
again they shared a splendid funer.al feast in Hector's honor, held in the house of Priam, King 
by will of Zeus. And so the Trojans buried Hector breaker of horses."); MOZI, BASIC 
WRITINGS 20 (Burton Watson trans., 2003) ("Let us suppose that one wishes to increase the 
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number of skilled archers and chariot drivers in the state. One must set about enriching and 
honoring such men, respecting and praising them. Once this has been done, one will have no 
difficulty in obtaining a multitude of them."); id. at 23 ("[W]hy do they fail to perceive that 
honoring the worthy is the foundation of government?"); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis M. 
Cornford trans., 1941) (1980 ed.) (discussing the broader character of the person driven by 
honor (time), intermediate between the philosophical rulers focused on wisdom, and the 
persons whose passions focus on wealth or other appetites); THE WAY OF LAO Tsu 115 (Wing-
Tsit Chan trans., 1963) ("To be proud with honor and wealth [i]s to cause one's downfall. 
Withdraw as soon as your work is done."); id. at 103 ("Do not exalt the worthy, so that the 
people shall not compete."). But cf THE WAY OF LAO Tsu 8-9 ("Honour is felt to depend 
more on those who confer than on him who receives it; and we feel instinctively that the good 
is something proper to its possessor and not easily taken from him. Again, people seem to 
seek honour in order to convince themselves of their own goodness .... "). See also THE 
BHAGAVAD-GITA: KRISHNA'S COUNSELS IN TIME OF WAR 68 (Barbara Stoller Miller trans., 
1986) ("[A]ny man who acts with honor cannot go the wrong way."); CICERO, ON 
OBLIGATIONS 96 (P.G. Walsh trans., 2000) ("[I]fwe are born to embrace the honourable, and 
this must either be our sole pursuit (as Zeno thought) or at any rate must be accounted to have 
immeasurably greater weight than all else (as Aristotle argues), then the necessary conclusion 
is that the honourable is either the sole or the highest good. Now what is good is certainly 
useful, and so whatever is honourable is useful."); MENCIUS bk. VI, pt. A, ,r 16, at 259 (D.C. 
Lau trans., rev. ed. 2003) ("Men of antiquity bent their efforts toward acquiring honours 
bestowed by Heaven[] and honours bestowed by man followed as a matter of course."). But 
cf THE BHAGAVAD-GJTA: KRISHNA'S COUNSELS IN TIME OF WAR l l3 (Barbara Stoller Miller 
trans., 1986) ("Impartial to foe and friend, honor and contempt, cold and heat, joy and 
suffering, he is free from attachment.") (note that English preserves the distinction between 
doing the honorable thing, and any public honors that may or may not be bestowed in 
response). See also FRANCIS BACON, THE ESSAYS 219 (John Pitcher ed., 1985) ("The winning 
of honour is but the revealing of a man's virtue and worth without disadvantage."); BOETHIUS, 
THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 32 (P.G. Walsh trans., 1999) (-524) ("What comment 
should I [Lady Philosophy] make on positions of honour and power, which you men in 
ignorance of true worth and power exalt to the heavens?"); MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON 
QUIXOTE OF LA MANCHA pt. l, ch. l, at 59 (Walter Starkie trans., 1957) (1964) (1605) ("He 
would follow their life, redressing all manner of wrongs and exposing himself to continual 
dangers, and at last, after concluding his enterprises, he would win everlasting honor and 
renown."); THOMAS CLEARY, CODE OF THE SAMURAI: A MODERN TRANSLATION OF THE 
BUSHIDO SHOSHINSU 60 (1999) (-1700) ("A warrior performs distinguished military feats on 
the battleground and earns the highest honor only after accepting the fact that he is going to 
die.") (for further commentary, see G. Cameron Hurst III, Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The 
Bushido Ideal, 40 PHIL. E. & W., no. 4, Oct. 1990, at 51 l); THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF 
MONTAIGNE bk. II, ch. 7, 276 ("Of Honorary Awards") (Donald M. Frame trans., 1943) 
(2004) (1580) ("[S]ince these honorary awards have no other value and prestige than this, that 
few people enjoy them, in order to annihilate them we have only to be lavish with them."); 
PIERRE CORNEILLE, LE Cm (1636) (for a sense of some of the pathologies of a complex 
medieval European code of honor); G. w. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
§ 327 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) ("[V]alour for the sake of honour, and 
knightly valour are not its true forms. . . . Not personal courage but integration with the 
universal is the important factor here."); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 59 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 
2009) ("To value a man at a high rate, is to honour him; at a low rate, is to dishonor him."); 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR (1906), available at 
www.Constitution.org/wj/meow.htrn; IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 20 (Peter Heath 
ed. & trans., reprint ed. 200 I) ("The pursuit of honour is more harmful to morality than any 
other passion. . . . I depart entirely from my inner state of moral goodness, and try to improve 
it with something external. ... The pursuit of honour will perhaps be [entirely] suspended in 
beings somewhat higher than ourselves; with us, it is still useful as a counter to greater 
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immorality, and to stiffen our resolve against extreme laziness, and thus it is needed for the 
lesser morality of mankind."); id. at 174 ("The love of honour we approve on all occasions in 
anyone, but the craving [of honour] we never do."); G.W. LEIBNIZ, THEODICY 404 (E.M. 
Huggard trans., 1985) (2007) ( 1709) ( one should honor not just power, but "wisdom, 
goodness, justice and other perfections") (on Thomas Hobbes); THOMAS MALORY, LE MORTE 
D' ARTHUR: KING ARTHUR AND THE LEGENDS OF THE ROUND TABLE (Keith Baines trans., 1962) 
(for some extraordinarily exotic aspects of a version of medieval honor); BERNARD DE 
MANDEVILLE, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF HONOR AND THE USEFULNESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN 
WAR 8 (first dialogue) (2003) (1732) ("When A performs an action which, in the eyes ofB, is 
laudable, B wishes well to A, and to show him his satisfaction, tells him, that such an action is 
an honor to him, or that he ought to be honored for it."); BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT 
OF THE LAWS bk. IV,§ II, at 32 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748) ("[T]hose things which 
honor forbids are more rigorously forbidden, when the laws do not concur in the prohibition; 
and those it commands are more strongly insisted upon, when they happen not to be 
commanded by law."); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GoOD AND EVIL 63 (Helen Zimmem 
trans., 2005) (1886) ("At present ... throughout Europe the herding-animal alone attains to 
honours and dispenses honours .... "); FRANCOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, COLLECTED 
MAXIMS AND OTHER REFLECTIONS 63 (E.H. & A.M. Blackmore et al. trans., 2008) (1665) ("In 
warfare, most men expose themselves to danger enough to preserve their honour" and will not 
be prevailed upon to advance one step farther.); ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ESSAYS AND 
APHORISMS 112 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1970) (1851) ("[W]hen a man feels tempted to 
commit a crime, ... the first thing he thinks of in opposition to the idea is the punishment 
appointed for it and the probability of its falling upon him; the second consideration is the risk 
to his honour. On these two objections he will, if I am not mistaken, ponder for hours before 
religious considerations so much as occur to him."); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND 
CRESSIDA act 5, sc. 3 ("Life every man holds dear; but the [brave] man holds honour far more 
precious-dear than life."); GEORG SJMMEL, CONFLICT & THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 164-
65 (Kurt H. Wolff & Reinhard Bendix trans., 1964) ("[D]ifferent aspects of the individual can 
be subsumed under different codes of honor which reflect the different groups to which the 
person belongs simultaneously."); id. at 165 ("[T]he feeling of honor suffices, in lieu of 
external methods of coercion, to make the individual conform to those norms which are 
required for the stability of the group."); ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD pt. I, bk. V, at 279 
(Demetrius B. Zema & Gerald G. Walsh trans., abridged ed. 1958) (describing human honor 
as "smoke that weighs nothing"); Otto von Bismarck, as quoted in FRANK HENDERSON 
STEWART, HONOR 51 (1994) ("[M]y honor lies in no-one's hand but my own.") (1881); 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 618 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., 2000) ( 1848) ("The medieval nobility reckoned military valor as the greatest of all the 
virtues, and indeed let it take the place of many of them. . . . It was therefore natural to glorify 
courage above all other virtues. Every manifestation thereof, even at the expense of common 
sense and humanity, was therefore approved and often even ordained by the manners of the 
time."); id. at 625 ("Honor among democratic nations, being less defined, is of necessity less 
powerful ... [thus] the comparative weakness of honor in democracies."); THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 31 (1953) (1899) ("Under this [unsophisticated] 
common-sense barbarian appreciation of the worth of honor, the taking of life-the killing of 
formidable competitors, whether brute or human-is honorable in the highest degree."); 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 102 (1993) ("[S]hame continues to work for us, 
as it worked for the Greeks, in essential ways. By giving through the emotions a sense of who 
one is and of what one hopes to be, it mediates between act, character, and consequence, and 
also between ethical demands and the rest of life."); WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Poems 
Dedicated to National Independence and Liberty, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS Sonnet 
17 (1888) ("Say what is Honour?-'Tis the finest sense of 'justice' which the mind can frame, 
intent each lurking frailty to disclaim .... "), available at http://www.bartleby.com/145/ 
ww354.html. 
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the Court in Alvarez struck down the Stolen Valor Act3 on free speech grounds.4 
The Stolen Valor Act, as apparently construed by the Court, criminalized most5 
intentional lying6 claims to have been awarded any of a number of military medals, 7 
especially the Congressional Medal of Honor, 8 whether the claimant thereby sought 
any material advantage or not.9 In any event, we shall treat the Stolen Valor Act as 
criminalizing what could be called pure lying in a discrete, extremely narrow,w 
range of cases. 
3 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 704 (West 2012) (codifying the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 120 Stat. 
3266) [hereinafter the Act]. 
4 See generally Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2551 
(Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring). For most purposes, the plurality opinion in Alvarez, rather 
than the opinion of Justices Breyer and Kagan concurring in the judgment, would convey the 
holding of the Court, pursuant to the guidance of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) and Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). Roughly put, the plurality strikes down the Stolen Valor Act on constitutional 
free speech strict scrutiny, whereas Justices Breyer and Kagan do so on a mid-level or 
intermediate scrutiny balancing test, despite the regulation's content-basis. For most purposes 
and in most contexts, the plurality's approach would seem "narrower" and less 
constitutionally dramatic. Justice Breyer, though interested in broad balancing, extends this 
particular speech only modest protection. See R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of 
Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 167 (1997), for 
further discussion of the idea of narrowness. 
5 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547 (excluding theatrical performances explicitly, and 
presumably, by reasonable implication, obvious satire, humor, and other non-assertive 
instances); id. at 2557 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
6 The plurality opinion is replete with explicit references both to (intentional) lying and to 
the far broader idea of a false claim. Justice Kennedy distinctively begins his opinion with the 
sentence "Lying was his habit." Id. at 2542 (plurality opinion). We address the plurality's 
multiple references both to lying and to false statements below. Justices Breyer and Kagan 
would read the Stolen Valor Act "as criminalizing only false factual statements made with 
knowledge and the intent that they be taken as true." Id. at 2552-53 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Ali to, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, similarly would 
restrict the scope of the Act to claims personally known to be false beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See id. at 2556-57, n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting). These two latter opinions, it might be noted, 
comprise five votes, in the context of the plurality's arguable equivocality, or lack of clarity, 
on the issue. See Thomas L. Carson, Lying and Deception and Related Concepts, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 153 (Clancy Martin 2009), for an excellent book-length analysis of 
the ideas of lying and attempted deception. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom 
of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. I 13 I; R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader 
Problem of Strict Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759 (2012). 
7 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at2542;seealso 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (West2012). 
8 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(c)(West 2012). 
9 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548. 
JO Neither the Stolen Valor Act, nor Alvarez, nor for the most part this Article, addresses 
ideas of honor in any of the dozens of important historical and cultural contexts not directly 
bearing upon military honor. Among the closer legal conceptions not addressed would be, for 
example the idea, whether obsolete or not, of honor in a business fiduciary capacity. See, e.g., 
the classic case of Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (a trustee as 
bound by "[ n Jot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"). The scope 
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Below, we work through the logic of the Alvarez plurality in some detail. 11 For 
convenience, though, we should at this early point suggest, without much 
explanation or defense, some of the Article's main conclusions. 
First, it would have been better if somehow, perhaps through luck and judicial 
ingenuity, it had been possible to avoid deciding the Alvarez case on the 
constitutional free speech merits. Whether the Stolen Valor Act was to be struck 
down, or upheld, on free speech grounds, the case's potential for direct and indirect 
damage to the law of freedom of speech and to jurisprudence more generally exceeds 
its affirmative value. 
This preferability of avoiding the free speech merits is not primarily because of 
any possible presumption that federal statutes should be considered constitutional, 12 
or of the value of judicial "passive virtues." 13 For whatever the classification might 
be worth, 14 the Stolen Valor Act is ordinarily classified as a regulation of speech that 
is based on the content of speech. 15 And whether justifiably or not, the typical rule 
seems to be that such content-based regulations of speech deserve, if anything, a 
presumption ofunconstitutionality. 16 
of the Act is, in theory, subject to some complication. Lying claims to have been personally 
awarded a military medal may take place in a wide range of circumstances, and for various 
purposes. Conceivably, one might thus lie (rather than lie about, say, one's specialized 
military training) with the sole intention of intimidating a violent aggressor who is threatening 
an innocent third party. For most constitutional purposes, however, it will be sensible to view 
the scope of the lies prohibited by the Stolen Valor Act as vanishingly narrow, in the sense 
that, in relative terms, nearly all contemporary (military- and non-military-related) lies are on 
subjects utterly unrelated to the Stolen Valor Act. Virtually every conceivable subject could 
be lied about. Perhaps a denial that one exists in any form at all could qualify as an exception. 
See generally RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND RELATED WRITINGS (Desmond 
M. Clarke ed., I 999) (I 63 7). But the Stolen Valor Act covers a nearly infinitesimally narrow 
range of possible and actual lies. Nor is it easy to imagine any political, social, or cultural 
idea that could not be as easily, cheaply, conspicuously, forcefully, or articulately made 
without violating the Act. 
11 See discussion infra Section II. 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for the 
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional 
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."). 
But see United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) ("When the 
government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual presumption of 
constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed.") (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382 (I 992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.")). 
l3 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 199-200 (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 
1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Richard A. Posner, 
The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519 (2012). 
14 See R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The 
Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333 (2006), for a generally 
somewhat skeptical view of the usefulness of the distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral restrictions of speech. 
15 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-44 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
16 See cases cited supra note 12; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Ashcroft v. 
CLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)). 
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Instead, the desirability, in the ideal, of not deciding Alvarez on the free speech 
merits reflects several factors more or less distinctive to the circumstances of the 
Alvarez case. First, a statute that can be interpreted to prohibit only deliberately 
lying about having been personally awarded a military medal is, for all practical 
purposes, an extremely minimal, if not practically undetectable, restriction on the 
defendant's meaningful freedom of speech. 17 It is difficult even to imagine 
circumstances under which someone wishes to make some more or less coherent 
political, social, or cultural point, and reasonably concludes that there is no equally 
articulate, inexpensive, conspicuous, or forceful way to make the point apart from 
deliberately lying about having personally been awarded a military medal. 18 The 
realistic direct or indirect burden of the Stolen Valor Act on freedom of speech is 
thus vanishingly small. The Court majority, however, was in this case unwilling to 
wait for the rare instance in which free speech is significantly implicated under the 
Act. 
Relatedly, the Stolen Valor Act's minimal speech impact is also remarkably 
even-handed, if not entirely neutral, as to the speaker's viewpoint on matters such as 
the value of military medals, military honor, honors in general, the process of 
awarding such medals, or any controversial military practice or policy. One could 
say that the Stolen Valor Act is literally based on speech content, 19 but much more 
significantly, not based on the viewpoint or likely viewpoint, if any, taken by 
violators of the Act. 
Even ifwe ignore the fact that political satire is outside the scope of the Act,20 we 
can imagine the statute being violated by someone who covets the medal and envies 
its recipients; by someone who is indifferent to or disdainful of such medals and 
their recipients but who seeks to somehow benefit, tangibly or intangibly, from 
claiming to have been awarded such a medal; and even by someone who objects to 
some aspect of military policy or to the awarding of medals, who has perhaps not 
minimally reflected on alternative ways of expressing their point.21 It is difficult to 
see the Stolen Valor Act as realistically burdening or advantaging one viewpoint or 
another, systematically, in any meaningful public policy debate.22 
More basically, and again without much elaboration, the need to decide the 
Alvarez case on the free speech merits becomes even more elusive when we 
consider, as a second factor, the only minimal relation between typical violations of 
17 See supra note 10. 
18 See id. 
19 See supra note 14. 
20 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
21 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The fact that the Stolen Valor Act apparently 
does not prohibit a deliberate lie to the effect that one was not awarded a medal seems 
constitutionally irrelevant. 
22 It is barely conceivable that claiming, deliberately falsely, to have been personally 
awarded a medal could attract media attention not attainable through, say, conspicuously 
destroying a medal. But if it is precisely the illegality of the method of protest that attracts 
increased media attention, there is an odd instability in claiming both that the lie should be 
legally protected, and that the deliberate illegal lie was chosen in order to maximize media 
attention. If the lie is held to be legally protected, the assumed unique advantage of lying 
illegally in order to disseminate some message would presumably disappear. 
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the Act and the recognized basic reasons for constitutionally protecting speech in 
general. As the various Stolen Valor Act prosecutions23 predictably suggest, the 
extent to which deliberate lying about one's having been awarded a military medal 
promotes any of the basic reasons for constitutionally protecting speech typically 
ranges from minimal, to zero, to, rather frequently, some negative magnitude. 
Roughly put, violating the Act typically has at best no free speech value. 
Briefly, it is widely assumed that the basic purposes underlying the free speech 
clause include promoting the collective search for truth, of one sort or another; 
promoting one conception or another of the idea of character, self-fulfillment, or 
self-actualization; and promoting meaningful democratic self-government and 
appropriate checks on the exercise of official authority.24 
It is difficult to see the intentional lie that one has personally been awarded a 
particular military medal as meaningfully contributing, in a typical case, to any of 
the above basic purposes of protecting free speech. This remains true even if we 
take account of indirect effects, slippery slopes, vague boundaries, chilling effects, 
breathing spaces, imprecision of language, and the risks of judicial error. We can 
certainly imagine circumstances in which a lie in general could promote the 
discovery or dissemination of important truths, or some other cognizable value.25 
But to imagine, for example, that calculated mendacity specifically under the Stolen 
Valor Act typically promotes, say, the search for truth is to lose oneself in fanciful 
hypothetical cases.26 
Yet more briefly, the third general consideration suggesting the desirability of 
seeking to avoid deciding Alvarez on the free speech merits focuses on 
characterizing and somehow weighing the public interests arguably at stake in the 
Stolen Valor Act. Generally, those interests, whatever their weight, are neither 
tangible nor pecuniary. They are not generally amenable to empirical demonstration. 
The public interests at stake could be thought of as not only abstract, but as focused 
largely on certain presumed virtues.27 To a substantial degree, the asserted public 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va. 2011); United States v. Perelman, 737 F. Supp. 2d 
1221 (D. Nev. 2010). 
24 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1985) 
(1859); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-4 
(1966); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY ( 1982); Kent 
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989). On character in 
particular, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1567, 1571 
(1999) (including in particular the trait of "respect for evidence," which hardly seems 
typically advanced by self-serving conscious lies with minimal social import). 
25 See generally Wright, supra note 6. Justice Breyer's opinion is also concerned that 
false statements in policy debates may hone or enliven our sense of the truth, and that some 
prohibitions on false statements-again, if not calculated personally-focused lies-may chill 
or inhibit valuable speech. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551, 2553. 
26 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 APPENDIX: THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWSPEAK 298 (Signet ed. 
1977) (1949) for the intentional, systematic, institutionalized, and extreme case where the 
truth-telling/lying distinction is entirely abandoned. 
27 For broader introductions to aretaic or virtue ethics, see Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY ch. 18 (David Copp ed., 2007); Rosalind 
Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2012), 
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interests are symbolic, expressive, identity-constitutive, or deontic, and thus 
especially difficult to measure, unless we want to say that to adopt and enforce the 
statute just is to thereby promote the relevant public interest, whatever its weight. 
Worse, the public interests at stake center on one dimension of a particular 
conception of honor. The basic problem is that our contemporary legal culture, 
along with our broader culture, seems largely remote from this particular conception 
of honor. The proper weight of the relevant conception of military honor seems, at 
this point, hopelessly indeterminate. To grossly oversimplify, perhaps we, as a 
culture, fall somewhere between the above extremes of Falstaft28 and Quixote29 
when we think about honor in the relevant sense. What weight should be given to 
considerations of honor in the relevant sense is thus grossly indeterminate. But this 
underlying severe indeterminacy is hardly sufficient grounds for developing a fully 
responsible Supreme Court constitutional analysis. And it is, further, entirely 
unclear why federal courts are better placed than Congress, or have even a genuine 
comparative advantage30 over Congress, in assessing the value of promoting, to one 
degree or another, the particular notion of military honor in question. 
The fourth and final general consideration that counsels against deciding Alvarez 
on the free speech merits is closely related to the indeterminacies of the various 
public interests arguably at stake in Alvarez. This consideration, however, focuses 
on the degree of "tailoring" or "fit" between the scope of the Act's prohibitions and 
the promotion of one or more of the relevant public interests.31 How overinclusive 
or underinclusive, one might ask, is the Act, given its purposes? Or, perhaps more 
vaguely, how necessary is the Act, as drafted or as permissibly interpreted, to the 
more or less effective promotion of one or more of the Act's purposes? Would a 
significantly less speech-burdensome regulation promote the Act's purposes as well, 
or nearly as well? 
This inquiry again presumes that the Act, as reasonably interpreted, does indeed 
significantly burden freedom of speech and the basic purposes for protecting 
freedom of speech, which again seems quite doubtful. What relevant point, 
argument, or political perspective can the defendant not easily, articulately, and 
fervently make, to an otherwise available audience, under the Act? 
One might then wonder why we do not simply presume that if the Act has 
symbolic or expressive goals, the Act, unless it is somehow "inarticulate," naturally 
available at www.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue. See also CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE 
ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003). See generally, R. George Wright, Constitutional Cases 
and the Four Cardinal Virtues, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 195 (2012). 
28 See SHAKESPEARE, supra note • and accompanying text. 
29 See CERVANTES, supra note 2, at 59. 
30 Even if courts are not absolutely better than Congress at this sort of assessment, it might 
be argued, however implausibly, that the courts hold, at least by some loose analogy, what the 
economists refer to as a Ricardian comparative advantage, and that this should be decisive. 
See generally Ralph Byrns, Comparative Advantage and Absolute Advantage (2011), 
www.unc.edu/depts/ econ/byrns _ web/Economicae/Essays/ ABS_ Comp_ Adv.htm. 
31 See Wright, supra note 6, for discussion. And again, at least by analogy, we should be 
asking here whether the courts hold a Ricardian comparative advantage over Congress or over 
expert administrative agencies in determining, or re-determining, such questions. See Byrns, 
supra note 30. 
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fulfills such goals. A Labor Day tribute typically expresses appreciation for labor. 
A largely symbolic or expressive statute could conceivably send a garbled or 
distorted message, but the sensible presumption would run the other direction. 32 Any 
traditional tailoring inquiry may thus seem oddly misplaced. 
More specific to Alvarez is the attempt to address tailoring questions in the 
context of the relevant conceptions of military honor. If courts in particular have 
understandable difficulties in mapping the interests, symbolic and non-symbolic, 
served by the Stolen Valor Act,33 it is difficult to imagine how the courts could 
determine whether the Act is overly inclusive or underinclusive as to its purposes. 
The point is not merely that courts inevitably face difficulties in determining the 
presence or absence of narrow tailoring. Rather, the courts will face exceptional 
difficulties in non-arbitrarily deciding questions of tailoring regarding the 
exceptionally murky, perhaps unfamiliar,34 subtle, and contested idea of military 
honor and its promotion. Under these rare circumstances, whether some alternative 
statutory or non-statutory scheme would in practice have a similar effect on the 
various complex and partly intangible aspects of military honor is inescapably quite 
speculative. For the courts to proceed first through all of the preceding steps, and 
then to attempt a narrow tailoring analysis, amounts to compounded judicial 
speculation, of a sort that the social theorist Michael Oakeshott referred to--
critically-as "rationalism. "35 
These four general considerations, jointly, thus suggest that if at all possible, 
Alvarez and similar Stolen Valor Act cases should not have been decided on the 
32 By loose analogy, an official's pronouncing persons, under the prescribed conditions, to 
be thereby married may indeed constitute them as married. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, How 
TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS ch. 1 (2d ed. 1975) (1955) (discussing "performatives"). 
33 Consider, in the extreme, the Falstaff versus Quixote conflict. SHAKESPEARE, supra 
note *; CERVANTES, supra note 2, at 59; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text 
(considering the variously diverse understandings of the scope of military honor on display). 
34 See FRANK HENDERSON STEW ART, HONOR 9 (1994) ("[H]onor no longer plays much part 
in our thinking."); Whitley Kaufman, Understanding Honor: Beyond the Shame/Guilt 
Dichotomy, 37 SOCIAL THEORY & PRAC. 557, 557 (2011) ("For most of the modem era, the 
idea of honor as a code of conduct has been treated as at best a historical curiosity and at worst 
a primitive and violent value system."); Sharon R. Krause, Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
The Honor Code, 25 ETHICS & lNT'L AFF. 475,475 (2011) ("The language of honor is apt to 
strike the modem reader as quaint, even obsolete, if not downright pernicious."). Written use 
of the (obviously ambiguous) word "honor" (or "honour"), along with several cognates and 
associated terms, including "valor," "valiant," "shameful," and "disgraceful," seems to be flat, 
if not trending downward. The reader is invited to enter these and related forms into the 
GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content. 
35 MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1-4 (reprint ed. 
1984) (1947); see id. at 2 (referring in particular to "the rapidity with which [the Rationalist] 
reduces the tangle and variety of experience to a set of principles which he will then attack or 
defend only upon rational grounds," and to the Rationalist as incapable of "accepting the 
mysteries and uncertainties of experience without any irritable search for order and 
distinctiveness"). Relatedly, Friedrich Hayek points to the unrealism of assuming that "we 
possess all the relevant information, [and that we] can start out from a given system of 
preferences and ... we command complete knowledge of all available means." F.A. Hayek, 
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REv. 519, 519 (1945). 
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constitutional free speech merits. As it happened, of course, Alvarez was in fact 
decided on just those grounds. 
And that is regrettable. But the especially interesting point is that even if Alvarez 
is to be decided on free speech grounds, the four considerations enumerated above 
do not in the slightest lose their importance. As we now illustrate in discussing the 
Alvarez plurality, these four considerations should, in a different sense, still be 
thought of as crucial. The above four considerations counseling against deciding the 
case on free speech grounds also operate, collectively, to clearly suggest that on the 
merits of the free speech claim, Alvarez was wrongly decided. Our four 
considerations thus also suggest that, as reasonably interpreted, the Stolen Valor Act 
should not have been judicially struck down. 
II. THE ALVAREZ CASE IN PERSPECTIVE 
A. A Narrow Sub-Class of Lies Versus a Broad Class of False Statements 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the plurality in Alvarez combines classic free 
speech rhetoric, drawn from subversive advocacy cases,36 with an application of 
what might be called "rationalism. ,m The judicial formulas applied by Justice 
Kennedy in Alvarez do not map well onto the actual terrain of the Alvarez case and 
its facts. If, as has been claimed, generals have a tendency to re-fight the previous 
war, 38 the Court as well has a tendency to deform new kinds of free speech cases in 
an attempt to fit them into favored, if not especially relevant, historical templates. 
One of the crucial moves in Alvarez is to characterize the category of speech 
being restricted not as deliberate lies told merely about one's having been awarded a 
military medal, but much more broadly, as something like any and all false 
statements in general.39 While it is indeed true that all lies on a particular narrow 
36 As though the Act tended to suppress some disfavored political view, the plurality, 
refighting the Court's historically most institutionally glorious battles against the censorship 
of unpopular ideologies, invokes within the same paragraph both Justice Brandeis's historic 
endorsement of a "more speech" remedy and Justice Holmes's legendary "marketplace of 
ideas" metaphor. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) ("[I]f there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 256, 277 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."). 
37 OAKESHOIT, supra note 35, at 2. 
38 See, e.g., G. TERRY MADONNA & MICHAEL YOUNG, FIGHTING THE LAST WAR (June 4, 
2002), available at http://www.fandm.edu/politics/politically-uncorrected-column/2002-
politically-uncorrected/fighting-the-last-war. 
39 Justice Breyer's opinion sensibly construes the statute to regulate only intentional, 
personal lies as to entitlement to military medals, but then goes on to see this as a remarkably 
broad field of public and private discourse, including cases where the necessary mens rea 
cannot be shown, as well as cases of barroom banter. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551, 2555 
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia preferred the lowest level of descriptive generality 
realistically applicable in the fascinating visitation rights case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110 (1989). See Jack Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1994), for discussion in this context of judicially settling upon one 
level of descriptive generality or another. 
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subject also fall within the immensely broad category of "false statements,"40 
treating the issue as whether false statements in general-without more41-should be 
prohibitable drains the case of most of its distinctiveness, meaning, and interest 
value. 
We can all think of many different kinds of false statements-even deliberate lies-
that should be immune from legal prohibition, based on the speaker's intent and the 
direct or indirect consequences. Some false statements may be necessary to ward off 
an immense evil to innocent third parties.42 Other false statements, at little social 
cost, promote sheer decency and civility in social life.43 As to the latter, consider a 
public declaration that a new outfit makes a beloved elderly friend or relative look 
"wonderful," where that assessment is not actually entertained. Yet other false 
statements should be protected, as in the case of good faith reasonably researched 
critiques of official conduct, lest we discourage the optimal level of public scrutiny 
and debate over the operations of government. 44 
Treating the Alvarez case as though it were a matter of whether false statements 
in general can be prohibited thus makes the case substantially easier than it is, and 
skews the outcome. And to then assume, as the Court occasionally seems to do, that 
the Act penalizes false speech "without more," or with no further judicially 
cognizable harm, such as fraud, theft, or obtaining improper pecuniary benefits,45 
further begs the constitutional question against the statute. If we find some 
meaningful substantive, symbolic, or expressive public interest being promoted by 
the Act, why would that interest, whatever its weight, not count as "more," beyond 
merely an arbitrary statutory distaste for lying, apart from any adverse public 
consequences? 
B. Content, Viewpoint, and Genuine Burden on Free Speech 
The Alvarez plurality then characterized the Stolen Valor Act as a content-based 
restriction on speech,46 which in some obvious and mechanical sense it clearly is. 
40 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544-45 (plurality opinion) (expanding the judicial focus 
to false statements in general). See, e.g., THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2010), for discussion in this context of judicially settling upon one 
level of descriptive generality or another. Whether a lie must also include some sort of 
realistic intent to deceive is more controversial. See id.; Roy Sorensen, Bald-Faced Lies! 
Lying Without the Intent to Deceive, 88 PAC. PHIL. Q. 251, 252 (2007). 
41 Distinguishing prior cases involving false statements associated with some distinct 
cognizable legal harm, the plurality asserts that "[o]ur prior decisions have not confronted a 
measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more." Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2545 (emphasis added). 
42 See Wright, supra note 6 (discussing Shoah and Fugitive Slave cases). 
43 See United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (denying rehearing en bane), for a listing in the lower court opinion of Judge Alex 
Kozinski. 
44 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 
(1964) (providing for constitutional breathing space for merely negligently false claims of 
fact, to minimize chilling effects on robust public debate)). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2543, 2544. 
858 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:847 
Prohibiting any and all criticism of the military, of military policy, or of medal 
awards or the process of awarding them would, however, be subjected to precisely 
the same test. 47 Content-based regulations generally evoke strict judicial scrutiny, 
with the burden on the government to show the effective promotion of a compelling 
government interest by necessary or narrowly tailored means.48 But in practice, not 
all content-based restrictions on speech are created equal, or have even remotely 
analogous effects on the freedom of speech. 
As we have already seen,49 Alvarez, and the typical Stolen Valor Act cases, if the 
Act is reasonably interpreted, do not present considerations of legal right, interest, or 
policy that would justify the application of a stringent strict scrutiny test. As we 
have seen, Alvarez, and typical cases under the Act, clearly do not meaningfully 
implicate any of the significant reasons50 for specially protecting speech in the first 
place.51 It is difficult to see why a demanding content-based strict scrutiny test is 
appropriate where the logic and interests underlying such a test are inapplicable. 
In general, the Act did not impose any significant burdens on Alvarez or on the 
typical defendant with respect to any minimally coherent social point, view, 
argument, or perspective, whether factual or normative, that they might wish to 
convey, with regard to any recognizable subject.52 Suppose a potential defendant 
wished to make some social point, either critically or supportively, about military 
medals, honor, a culture of honor, gender bias, military aggression, pacifism, 
individual or collective public guilt, contemporary imperialism, militarism, neo-
colonialism, hierarchy, or essentially any other topic. How does the Stolen Valor 
Act, appropriately interpreted, raise the costs, or impair the use of the obvious 
channels, in doing so? The Act penalizes a remarkably narrow class of personalized, 
self-serving lies, but leaves policy debate in all meaningful respects essentially 
unaffected. 
There is thus simply no pragmatic value-no worthwhile purposes-in 
subjecting the Act to a rigorous strict scrutiny test. To adapt the language of the 
Supreme Court and of Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner from a different First 
Amendment context: "The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by 
any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent."53 
The typical violator of the Act as sensibly interpreted will be making no purportedly 
41 See Wright, supra note 14, at 333. 
48 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544, 2549. 
49 See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. 
50 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
51 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
53 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)); Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 877 
(7th Cir. 2012) (en bane) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Brandt v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.3d 460, 
465 (7th Cir. 2007) (determining that public school student's shirt with a contextualized 
protest meaning did not enter into the competitive marketplace of ideas or amount to the 
expression of ideas or opinions in a constitutionally cognizable sense)). See generally R. 
George Wright, What Counts as "Speech" in the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the 
Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
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socially meaningful point beyond, at best, some claustrophobically narrow 
expression ofnarcissistic,54 self-focused,55 calculated mendacity. 
C. Slippery Slopes, Principles, and Reasonable Judgment 
It is possible to imagine circumstances-whether subject to likely prosecution or 
not-under which, say, an innocent person is credibly informed that a bomb will be 
detonated in a crowded public space unless the innocent party publicly claims, 
falsely, to have been awarded a military medal. Beyond any defense of necessity or 
duress, we would presumably not want to burden this victim with a misdemeanor 
offense. We can thus at least imagine a hard case under the Act, whether free 
speech-related or not. 
Some thought, relatedly, should certainly be given to what other statutes might 
also have been held constitutional, in the future, if the Stolen Valor Act had been 
upheld as against a free speech claim. There are, in the more general decisional law, 
occasionally some treacherously slippery slopes.56 Is it not possible that upholding 
the Act could have licensed courts to similarly uphold other statutes, where there 
might be real burden on free speech? There will, admittedly, never be a concrete, 
invariably sound, non-manipulable, non-abusable, unambiguous public rule allowing 
judges to say which cases are more like a typical Stolen Valor Act case, and which 
cases should instead be distinguished. 
The plurality in fact argues that: 
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, 
whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper,57 
would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about 
which false statements are punishable.58 That governmental power has no 
54 Narcissism, in its broadest senses, does not seem currently undersupplied. See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF 
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (rev. ed. 1991); JEAN M. TWENGE & w. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE 
NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT (paperback ed. 20 I 0). 
55 See R. George Wright, The Constitutional Status of Speech About Oneself, 59 CLEV. ST. 
L. REv. 489 (2012), for discussion of the relation between speech for constitutional purposes 
and a subject-matter focus on the self. 
56 See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). See 
also Jailbert Leasing, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 449 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006). 
57 The plurality actually raises the "whispered" assertion scenario twice. See United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion). One cannot help but note that, 
say, a whispered slander, a whispered blackmail threat, and whispered fraud, where otherwise 
actionable, do not gain free speech protection because of their whispered status. 
58 Actually there do seem to be subjects lying about which can expose one to misdemeanor 
liability. Or at the very least, falsely claiming, even in a whisper, to be an Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent is presumably prosecutable, 
whether one extracts money from one's auditors or not, as the plurality recognizes. Id. at 
2546. To distinguish such cases from the Stolen Valor Act, the plurality suggests that such 
criminal prohibition serves a public interest in reputation and dignity. See id. Apparently, 
such interests are not thought to be paralleled in the Stolen Valor Act cases. Consider also the 
case of perjury with no effect on the verdict. 
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clear limiting principle. 59 Our constitutional tradition stands against the 
idea that we need Oceania's60 Ministry ofTruth.61 
Each of these claims, as the corresponding footnotes below suggest, is 
contestable. But at the end of the day, even the most sensitively drawn rule or 
principle separating protected from unprotected speech much inevitably run out. 
Rather than attribute free speech value to particular narrow, concrete, self-focused, 
easily limited categories of speech, quite apart from viewpoint, where such free 
speech value is clearly lacking, courts should instead rely first upon a minimal 
degree of legislative prudence and discretion, and then if necessary adopt the best 
distinctions available. 
On this point, we can again draw from Judge Posner's observation in a separate 
first amendment context: "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability 
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow."62 Ultimately, 
once our best available principles have provided all the guidance they can, we have 
no choice but to apply our faculties of judgment, 63 in seeking to apply the general 
principle to the particular case,64 as the philosopher Immanuel Kant reminds us.65 If 
and when, say, a statute makes diplomatic fibbing to an obtuse would-be suitor into a 
crime, such a case can then be adjudicated on one grounds or another, whether those 
grounds might be of some constitutional nature or otherwise 
If courts try to avoid exercising practical judgment, they merely push the 
inescapable problem a level deeper, without resolving it. There is no clear principle 
to tell us what counts as speech for constitutional purposes in the first place, and 
what does not.66 We must apply our best judgment, with limited guidance of 
principle, in drawing this distinction. If we refuse to draw the best such distinction 
we can, avoiding or otherwise managing any slippery slopes where we detect them, 
we are driven to either count literally everything as speech or else nothing as speech. 
Judgment on the basis of developing principles is realistically inescapable. 
The impulse to avoid exercising sensible judgment, as distinct from rule-
application, even where the rule is evidently inappropriate, may help account for the 
59 The absence of a concrete, articulable, clear "limiting principle" inherent in some rule 
or case holding, does not seem to take the exercise of state police powers, up until some 
constitutional conflict is thought to arise, outside of the rule of law. See, e.g., Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see also South Carolina v. 
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
60 Whether Oceania's Ministry of Truth determines, on sound or unsound grounds, which 
subjects are such that (genuinely) false statements on those subjects should be prohibitable is 
subject to doubt. 
61 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547. 
62 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 877 (7th Cir. 2012) (en bane) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
63 See IMMANUEL KANT, EDUCATION 71 (Annette Churton trans., Ann Arbor paperback ed. 
1960) (1803). 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See generally Wright, supra note 53. 
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plurality's approach in another respect. The plurality, as we have seen, describes the 
relevant speech category in Alvarez with remarkable breadth, as "false speech,"67 
apparently in general. 
On the basis of this unduly broad characterization,68 the Alvarez plurality then 
endorses69 the idea that the list of viewpoint-neutral categories of literal speech that 
are outside the scope of the free speech clause's protection is, largely,70 historically 
closed. 71 The plurality imagines that the argument for not stringently 
constitutionally protecting violations of the Stolen Valor Act relies on a balancing of 
the costs and benefits of the Act.72 
In reality, while nearly any argument can be cast in cost-benefit terms, our 
argument has instead emphasized that typical Stolen Valor Act cases simply do not 
significantly implicate the basic reasons for protecting speech,73 and closely 
relatedly, that there will typically be no meaningful burden on the defendant's 
freedom of speech. 74 This is more a matter of the logical inapplicability of the free 
speech clause than of an attempt to broadly balance interests. The free speech clause 
serves particular interests and purposes; it is not an idol to which we must sacrifice 
our interests and purposes. 
D. Issues of Government Interests and Tailoring in Alvarez 
The Alvarez plurality then tests the Stolen Valor Act by strict scrutiny.75 As the 
plurality will eventually find a lack of sufficiently narrow tailoring for the Act to 
survive,76 the plurality's discussion of any public interest or interests underlying the 
Act is, in a sense, ultimately inconsequential. But it is also fair to say that the 
plurality's discussion of possible public interests underlying the Act does not fully 
reassure the reader that the Court has reflected more deeply on ideas of military 
honor, or of military honor in our culture, than has the Congress that enacted the 
legislation in question. In this case, the analyses of the interests at stake and of the 
question ofnarrow tailoring are actually largely inseparable. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546-47 (2012) (plurality opinion); 
see also supra notes 6, IO, 38-45 and accompanying text. 
68 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
69 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) and Brown v. Entm't 
Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011), for prior statements. See R. George Wright, 
Judicial Line-Drawing and the Broader Culture: The Case of Politics and Entertainment, 49 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 341 (2012), for criticism of this logic. See also Wright, supra note 31, at 
764-66. 
70 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at2547 (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 and Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2734) (holding open the possibility of historical but as yet judicially unrecognized 
exceptions to this rule of closure). 
71 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544, 2547. 
72 See id. 
73 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
75 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49, 2551. 
76 See id. at 2548-51. 
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The plurality, again, can afford to stipulate to the existence of a compelling 
government interest underlying the Act, as the Act is independently struck down on 
grounds of lack of narrow tailoring. 77 But there is, nonetheless, an unnerving lack 
of precision, clarity, and consistency in the plurality's discussion of the level or 
weight of the public interest at stake. 78 The plurality first characterizes the 
underlying interests as "not without significance."79 This initial, perhaps only 
preliminary description does not seem especially enthusiastic, let alone potentially 
constitutionally sufficient. 
The plurality then refers to the military medal award program as serving an 
"important public function."80 This sounds like an upgraded characterization. But 
typically, important government interests may suffice only for mid-level scrutiny,81 
and not under the more rigorous strict or exacting scrutiny standards applied to 
content-based regulations of speech. 82 
More ambiguously, the plurality then refers to the "interest in protecting the 
integrity of the Medal of Honor [in particular as] beyond question."83 Whether this 
means the interest is merely legitimate, or that it is constitutionally sufficient, is 
unclear, but this uncertainty then appears to be rendered moot by the plurality's 
apparent recognition of the government's interests, jointly or individually, as 
"compelling."84 In turn, the plurality's reference to the government's interest as 
"compelling" is again itself rendered moot by the plurality's later finding of a lack of 
sufficient narrow tailoring. 85 
Concretely, the plurality recognizes a number of relevant government interests. 
In particular, the plurality seems to endorse "recognizing and expressing gratitude 
for acts of heroism and sacrifice in military service;"86 fostering "morale, mission 
accomplishment and esprit de corps among service members;"87 promoting "a 
virtuous ambition ... as well as ... every species of military merit;"88 reinforcement 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 2548-49. 
19 Id. at 2548. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., United States v. VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 
(1980); and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), for examples of this standard mid-level 
scrutiny terminology, under which "important" governmental interests are linked to a mid-
level equal protection test. 
82 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548; Wright, supra note 14. 
83 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 2549-51. 
86 Id. at 2548. See ALLEN MIKAELIAN, MEDAL OF HONOR: PROFILES OF AMERICA'S 
MILITARY HEROES FROM THE CML WAR TO THE PRESENT 1-18 (2002), for a sense of 
exemplary cases, including the exceptional case of Civil War physician Dr. Mary Walker. 
81 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548. 
88 Id. 
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of"the pride and national resolve that the military relies upon to fulfill its mission;"89 
and "the integrity of the military honors system in general, and the Congressional 
Medal of Honor in particular."90 
The plurality does not make it entirely clear whether any single one, or any 
subset, of these interests rises to the level of the "compelling." We might 
uncontroversially say that successful national defense, in general, amounts to a 
compelling public interest. Whether any of the more specific and more instrumental 
interests listed above are, themselves, also compelling is less clear. Some seem to 
involve contributing to national defense, but to an apparently unspecified and 
unprovable degree. This murkiness of the interests at stake, and of their boundaries, 
must also affect any narrow tailoring analysis. 
It is also possible to argue that the above interests rise to the level of the 
compelling, but only when they are taken together, and added up. This interpretation 
may initially seem more appealing. But it is not hard to detect among the above 
interests a great deal of overlap. Courts must avoid double-counting of interests. 
Crucially, to the extent that the above interests do not overlap, and are 
compelling only when taken jointly, any test for narrow tailoring inevitably becomes 
unmanageably complex and unavoidably arbitrary. How likely is it that any statute 
that effectively promotes, say three or four distinct and jointly sufficient public 
interests will also be genuinely narrowly tailored as to all of them? This would 
apparently require being neither overinclusive nor underinclusive with respect to, 
presumably, all three or four of the distinct and jointly necessary interests at stake. 
Realistically, few statutes in such cases will really be so narrowly tailored; any such 
statute would inevitably be thus constitutionally vulnerable. Some courts, however, 
out of sympathy might choose to conclude otherwise. 
In any event, we must take account of the controversy associated with the idea of 
military honor, its value, its perceived or actual consequences, and its possible 
irreplaceability. Only then can we appreciate how artificial, speculative, and 
ultimately arbitrary the plurality's evaluation of the degree of statutory 
"effectiveness," the weight of the various interests, and the degree of tailoring must 
unavoidably be. And certainly, legal rules regarding personal references to one's 
having been awarded a military medal are far narrower in scope than the idea of 
military honor in general. 
Ultimately, judicial modesty and a general sense of institutional "comparative 
advantage" would counsel against the courts' taking some definitive stance on these 
unmanageable questions. At the very least, and as the dissenters in Alvarez observe, 
courts should be reluctant to second-guess Congress on such matters where the free 
speech or other constitutional interests in doing so are minimal at best.91 The Court's 
s9 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. Justice Alito's dissenting opinion 
observes that "[b]oth the plurality and Justice Breyer argue that Congress could have 
preserved the integrity of military honor by means other than a criminal prohibition, but 
Congress had ample reason to believe that alternative approaches would not be adequate." 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537, 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting). This judgment as to the weight of the 
evidence on effectiveness, viable alternatives, and narrow tailoring is in its own way just as 
speculative and contestable as the plurality's contrary conclusion. Rather than reach any 
conclusion on the merits of the question of narrow tailoring-which in this case is nearly 
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efforts in doing so result, at a minimum, in less attention by the Court to other 
matters, including other issues and other cases, where the Court may hold a 
comparative advantage over Congress and its legislative staff. 
III. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL MODESTY IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNUSUAL 
UNCERTAINTY AND Low RISK TO CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
Judicial modesty in Alvarez makes perfect sense in the context of a contemporary 
culture with diverse strains of thought and preference on the subject of military 
honor, ranging, as we have suggested, at least from Falstafr12 to Quixote.93 The 
contemporary political philosopher Charles Taylor has briefly summarized the 
history of one side of our ambivalence toward military honors: 
[t)he ethic of honour and glory, after receiving one of its most inspiring 
expressions in Corneille, is subjected to a withering critique in the 
seventeenth century. Its goals are denounced as vainglory and vanity, as 
the fruits of an almost childish presumption. We find this with Hobbes as 
well as with Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, and Moliere. But the negative 
arguments in these writers are not new. Plato himself was suspicious of 
the honour ethic, as concerned with mere appearances. The Stoics 
rejected it; and it was denounced by Augustine as the exaltation of the 
desire for power .... 94 
The inclination to disparage military-related honor in particular was, of course, 
hardly exhausted in the seventeenth century.95 
Another contemporary political philosopher, Kwame Anthony Appiah, takes a 
more ambivalent, if not warily favorable, approach to military honor. Professor 
Appiah writes that 
[t]hose who train our armies claim that military honor is essential in both 
motivating and civilizing the conduct of warfare. . . . I am inclined to 
believe them. But the trouble, of course, is that sentiments [ of military 
honor]-and what even moderately sensitive soul does not feel the 
temptation of responding to the call of those bugles?-make us more 
likely to go to war.96 
hopelessly complex-the Court should have taken an agnostic approach, and deferred to the 
apparently reasonable if fallible judgment of Congress, given the minimal free speech interests 
genuinely at stake. 
92 See SHAKESPEARE, supra note •. 
93 See CERVANTES, supra note 2, at 59. 
94 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 214 
(1989); see also Kaufman, supra note 34, at 557; Krause, supra note 34, at 475. 
95 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
96 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: How MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 190 
(2010); see James Bowman, The Right Thing: A Philosopher Misunderstands Humanity's 
Code, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 17, 2011, available at www.jamesbowman.net/ 
articleDetail.asp?pubID=2076, for a review of Professor Appiah's book. 
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And of course, there are more unambiguously favorable assessments of the value 
of military and related forms of honor as well.97 Among contemporary writers, 
Alexander Welsh98 and Sharon Krause99 both note that honor can inspire the valuable 
subordination, or even the complete sacrifice, of one's most basic personal interests, 
potentially for the community's greater good. 100 
The range of plausible evaluations of military honor, and of the necessity for 
particular formal systems thereof, varies widely. What would be implausible is the 
claim that what is necessary in order to cost-effectively assess such matters is legal 
training, a judicial temperament, and exposure to a judicial record. Assessing such 
matters is ultimately a matter of the best cost-effective practical wisdom101 and 
prudential 102 judgment a culture, or some particular institution, can bring to bear. 
In the absence of any serious free speech values meaningfully hanging in the 
balance, 103 the Court should have sought to avoid deciding Alvarez on constitutional 
free speech merits. 104 If the latter course was indeed unavoidable, the Court should 
have acknowledged its lack of any decisive comparative advantage over Congress in 
judging such contestable matters, and deferred to any reasonable congressional 
regulatory scheme. 105 An appropriate judicial modesty, in the absence of any 
significant countervailing values, would have discouraged any more ambitious 
judicial undertaking. 
97 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
98 ALEXANDER WELSH, WHAT IS HONOR? A QUESTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES (2008). 
99 Sharon Krause, The Politics of Distinction and Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of 
Liberty in Montesquieu, 31 POLITY 469 (1999). 
100 See WELSH, supra note 98, at 4 ("honor ... can ... induce a sense of obligation that 
overrides both immediate desires and long term interests"); Krause, supra note 99, at 471 
("honor ... cannot be reduced to self-interest, even self-interest well-understood, because 
honor may motivate the sacrifice of one's most fundamental interest, life itself') 
(sympathetically expounding Montesquieu's position); see also id. at 477 (honor "reminds us 
that there is more to being human than getting by"); id. at 494 ("democratic alternatives to 
honor, such as self-esteem, dignity, and recognition, cannot replace honor"). See Douglas 
MacArthur, Sylvanus Thayer Award Acceptance Address: Duty, Honor, Country (May 12, 
1962), www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html, for an even 
more enthusiastic defense of the value of military honor. 
101 See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, Practical Wisdom: A Mundane Account, 106 PROC. OF 
THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 283 (2006). 
102 See, e.g., J.D. Mabbott, Prudence, 36 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'y 51, 56 (Supp. 
vol. 1962); Nathan Rotenstreich, Prudence and Folly, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 93 (1985). 
'
03 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part 11.B. 
104 See supra notes 13-35 and accompanying text. 
105 See discussion supra Part II. 

